https://countermail.com/

[tilltheend]

its based in Sweden from my understanding, which is NOT a good thing, but the idea itself doesn't sound bad.

Privacy and Security

Here are the most important things we do to keep your privacy and security:

* No cookies, CounterMail does not use cookies, cookies are evil
* No hard drives, our web server does not have any hard drives
* Clean email header, our mail-server can't reveal your IP-address
* No IP-logging, our server does not log IP-addresses
* We only use strong open source algorithms
* Personal data or individual account data is never shared or sold with third-parties

Trusted applications

We only use certified protocols and applications. OpenPGP is one of the most secure encryption protocols in the world. The base of our Java applet comes from a stable and reliable open source project: www.bouncycastle.org. If you want, you can validate the CounterMail-engine, our Java applet, by looking at the information window you see the first time you use it. You can read more about that here.

[Chicken_Hawk]

It does sound interesting.

Let us know if you find out more.

Hawk

[usa]

Seems to be working well. I have a trash acct there.

[ItalianMuscle]

How do you get this damn thing to work? I keep getting an error, everytime I try to login and use password. Isnt it free for 30 days?

[Chicken_Hawk]

How do you get this damn thing to work? I keep getting an error, everytime I try to login and use password. Isnt it free for 30 days?

I think all these damn emails think everyone who buys an account is a computer guru. It took me three days to set up PGP and I still can't decrypt messages I encrypt LOL

Hawk

[Mirrorshades]

its based in Sweden from my understanding, which is NOT a good thing, but the idea itself doesn't sound bad.

Privacy and Security

Here are the most important things we do to keep your privacy and security:

* No cookies, CounterMail does not use cookies, cookies are evil
* No hard drives, our web server does not have any hard drives
* Clean email header, our mail-server can't reveal your IP-address
* No IP-logging, our server does not log IP-addresses
* We only use strong open source algorithms
* Personal data or individual account data is never shared or sold with third-parties

Trusted applications

We only use certified protocols and applications. OpenPGP is one of the most secure encryption protocols in the world. The base of our Java applet comes from a stable and reliable open source project: www.bouncycastle.org. If you want, you can validate the CounterMail-engine, our Java applet, by looking at the information window you see the first time you use it. You can read more about that here.

Most of this sounds fine, until you read between the lines. Countemail may not, in fact, log IP addresses, but there is nothing to stop a court from ordering them to start. OpenPGP is a fine protocol, but Countermail's storage of the private half of the PGP keypair violates one of the bedrock principles of public key cryptography, and may lead to the same problems as were experienced by Hushmail.

Their Countermail engine sounds suspiciously like Hushmail's much vaunted Java applet, and we all know how Hushmail worked out, don't we?

Mirrorshades

[CounterMail]

Hi,

I saw this thread on google, and I would like clarify some things.

Most of this sounds fine, until you read between the lines. Countemail may not, in fact, log IP addresses, , but there is nothing to stop a court from ordering them to start

In many countries this is true, but in Sweden we don't have any law that forces us to collect IP-addresses.

OpenPGP is a fine protocol, but Countermail's storage of the private half of the PGP keypair violates one of the bedrock principles of public key cryptography, and may lead to the same problems as were experienced by Hushmail.

This is true only if we have the users password, because a private PGP-key is always encrypted using strong encryption with the personal password, a private PGP-key without the knowledge of the password is basically useless (unless the password is very easy), and in our case the user password is never sent to our server. Hushmail have two login types, Java and non-Java. In the non-Java version the password is sent to their server, in that case it's possible for them to collect the password. We only have one login type, the Java-version, and the password never leaves your computer.

Their Countermail engine sounds suspiciously like Hushmail's much vaunted Java applet, and we all know how Hushmail worked out, don't we?

Technique is similar to each other, but our applet is not the same as Hushmail uses.

We have some unique features:
-You can delete the privatekey from our server and store it whereever you want, eg. on an USB or on your local computer.
-Our applet can be stored locally, this will prevent anyone to change the applet without your knowledge
-SSL-MITM-protection, an extra layer that will prevent more advanced network sniffing
-E-mail body and attachments is stored in encrypted format even if the original message was sent from an unencrypted email (like Hotmail or Gmail)
-You can buy an USB-key to protect against keyloggers and other password attacks

We have invested a lot of time and money in our service, and we are work really hard to not make the same mistakes that other security providers do.

/Mattias
CounterMail.com

[usa]

Thanks Mattias we appreciate the words of wisdom straight from the source.

[Mirrorshades]

Hi,

I saw this thread on google, and I would like clarify some things.

Fair enough. Welcome to the Board.

Most of this sounds fine, until you read between
the lines. Countemail may not, in fact, log IP addresses, , but there is
nothing to stop a court from ordering them to start

In many countries this is true, but in Sweden we
don't have any law that forces us to collect IP-addresses.

Currently, you mean. Don't get me wrong, I'm not knocking the fact that no
such law currently exists, but laws can (and do) change overnight. If someone
had told me, a little over 5 years ago, that Hushmail could be forced by the
Canadian courts to modify their Java applet to capture their users' passphrases,
I'd have thought this the stuff of paranoid fantasy -- UNTIL IT ACTUALLY HAPPENED.

In Britain, it was just over 11 years ago that the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (RIPA) was passed into law. Part III of that Act, which came into
force some 3-4 years ago, now makes it a crime to refuse to decrypt any file/
message for which you are presented with an order to decrypt. The penalty is
up to 2 years in prison, and up to 5 years in prison for terrorism-related
matters. Britons have already been jailed for refusing to comply.

Here in Canada, within the next six months, I fully expect that the privacy
rights Canadians have enjoyed for more than a century and a half will be
gutted like a fish. As it stands right now, the police cannot compel an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to surrender information about one of their
customers in the absence of a warrant issued (and signed by) an independent
judge.

Once the so-called "lawful access" provisions are passed into law, and I
expect this will be in six months at the most, all this will be a thing of
the past. ISPs and other service providers will be required to hand over to
the police -- on request -- a huge amount of information on their customers.

OpenPGP is a fine protocol, but Countermail's
storage of the private half of the PGP keypair violates one of the bedrock
principles of public key cryptography, and may lead to the same problems as
were experienced by Hushmail.

This is true only if we have the users password,
because a private PGP-key is always encrypted using strong encryption with
the personal password, a private PGP-key without the knowledge of the
password is basically useless (unless the password is very easy), and in our
case the user password is never sent to our server. Hushmail have two login
types, Java and non-Java. In the non-Java version the password is sent to
their server, in that case it's possible for them to collect the password.
We only have one login type, the Java-version, and the password never leaves
your computer.

This is PRECISELY the same line of argument that Hushmail used in 2007. Even one of the original articles in ars.technica about this case parroted the line from Hushmail that Tyler Stumbo may not have used the Hushmail applet, but instead used the non-Java option. In response to this, one of the posters to the Cypherpunks list put it best, when he said:

My guess is that Hushmail has had subpoenas before and had to develop and install a modified java applet which captures the passphrase when the user enters it. With that and the stored keys, it can decrypt all the stored communications.

If that's true, I wouldn't expect them to trumpet it, since it would mostly negate their value proposition.

Their Countermail engine sounds suspiciously like Hushmail's much vaunted Java applet, and we all know how Hushmail worked out, don't we?

Technique is similar to each other, but our applet is not the same as Hushmail uses.

I wouldn't have expected it to be identical, but its purpose is essentially the same and, I would argue, potentially subject to the same exploitation as happened with Hushmail.

We have some unique features:

-You can delete the privatekey from our server and store it whereever you
want, eg. on an USB or on your local computer.

I did see the part about deleting the private key from your server -- this is a good idea. However, an even better idea would be to allow a user to generate and provide their own PGP public key, for which you never have had access to the private half.

-Our applet can be stored locally, this will prevent anyone to change the applet without your knowledge

That is a good feature; however, I wonder how you then go about updating the applet when necessary?

-SSL-MITM-protection, an extra layer that will prevent more advanced network sniffing

-E-mail body and attachments is stored in encrypted format even if the original message was sent from an unencrypted email (like Hotmail or Gmail)

-You can buy an USB-key to protect against keyloggers and other password attacks

These are all good features, which I have no problem with. My primary beef with your service is, that like Hushmail, you have access to the private half of the PGP keypair.

Many of my concerns would evaporate if you would offer an option to allow customers to generate/supply their own PGP public keys, in place of the ones that you generate/store for them.

We have invested a lot of time and money in our service, and we are work really hard to not make the same mistakes that other security providers do.

/Mattias
CounterMail.com

Mattias, I understand and appreciate that. Thank you for taking the time to setup an account here and respond to my concerns.

There is a saying in English, "Once burned, twice shy." In 2007, a lot of Hushmail users got burned, because Hushmail essentially promised them that their communications were inviolable -- Hush actually stated this in their FAQs, which were removed very quickly after Hushmail's compromise became public knowledge.

From the Hushmail FAQ, April 2002:

What if my message is subpoenaed?

Hush, like any company or individual, is legally bound to respond to court-issued subpoenas. However, because not even Hush can access the encryption keys of individual users, in the case of a subpoena Hush would only be able to provide the encrypted (coded) version of the transmitted email.

http://web.archive.org/web/200204032...ssagesubponaed

Needless to say, this was an utterly worthless promise as Hushmail was forced to provide 12CDs worth of decrypted email to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). DEA spokesmen have been quoted in media reports as stating that "hundreds of thousands" of emails were gathered-up. The fallout from this continues to this day.

Whether Hush was being over-optimistic, hopelessly naive, or just plain liars remains open to debate.

Mirrorshades

"How many of you have broken no laws this month? That's the kind of society I want to build. I want a guarantee -- with physics and mathematics, not with laws -- that we can give ourselves real privacy of personal communications."

-- John Gilmore

[Athens]

WOW! Good points Mirrorshades.